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1. Introduction 
Economists have traditionally modeled human behavior in terms of individual constrained 
maximization, saying relatively little about the effect of relationships between family, 
friends, neighbors and work colleagues. Such neglect perhaps reflected not an ignorance of 
the importance of such interactions, but rather an awareness of how difficult it is to model 
theoretically, and measure empirically, such phenomena. This reticence has, to some extent, 
dissipated in recent years with a flurry of work emerging on the relationship between social 
interaction and phenomena such as crime [Glaeeser et al. (1996)], educational choices 
[Sacerdote (2001, Lalive and Catteneo (2009)], school drop-out behaviour [Evans et al. 
(1992)], labour supply [Grodner and Kniesner (2006)], unemployment [Topa (2001)], 
disability behavior [Rege et al. (2009)] and retirement [Duflu and Saez (2003)].  
Of particular relevance to this study is the nascent body of work seeking evidence of 
cooperation in the workplace [see, for example, Bandiera et al. (2005, 2009, 2010, 2013), 
Carpenter and Seki (2011), Mas and Moretti (2009)]. 1 We contribute to this literature by 
modeling and measuring the relationship between a very precise workplace interaction and 
outcome. Very few employees work in complete isolation and so one would expect 
employee-interaction to be important for many workplace decisions and, therefore by 
extension, the labor market equilibria that relate to those decisions. A prime example is 
absenteeism.  
There is a small, but growing, literature examining worker-interaction and 
absenteeism [see, for example, Ichino and Maggi. (2000), Skåtun and Skåtun (2004). 
Heywood and Jirjahn (2004), Heywood et al  (2008), Barmby and Larguem (2009), Hesselius 
et al. (2010), Dale‐Olsen et al. (2011)]. Most of this literature has, of necessity, tried to 
                                                
1 For a review of the literature examining field experiments both within and between firms, see Bandiera et al. (2011). 
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interpret data where the margin of interaction between workers is to a large extent unknown. 
In the real world setting we examine here, that of optometrist services, the margin is very 
clearly defined because of the nature in which the service is organized. Each firm (i.e. 
workplace) is staffed by either one or two optometrists. In the latter case the two workers are 
substitutes in production - the absence of one imposes a utility cost on the other who is 
expected to undertake additional work for no additional pay. By identifying such costs we are 
able to derive clear comparisons as regards absence behavior within single- and two-worker 
firms.  
To motivate our empirical analysis we extend the theoretical framework developed in 
Barmby, Sessions and Treble (1994) - hereafter BST. BST focus on an atomistic worker 
whose health is represented by a continuous random variable, δ , and who absents if realized 
health is above some threshold level,  !δ , determined by wages, sick pay and contracted 
working hours. In our extension, firms comprise two interdependent workers who either 
cooperate or compete with one another by maximizing joint or individual utility accordingly. 
We show that sickness absence decisions are strategic complements - the more likely worker 
1 is to absent, the more likely will worker 2 call in sick since the latter’s expected utility is 
increasing in worker 2’s health threshold (i.e. with the likelihood that worker 2 does not 
absent).  
Within this extended framework we derive the equilibrium absence rates for three 
cases of interest - single-worker firm; two-worker non-cooperative firm; two-worker 
cooperative firm - and show that, relative to the single-worker optimum, non-cooperation 
implies a lower health threshold, and so higher absence, whilst cooperation yields either a 
higher or lower health threshold. Intuitively, if workers choose to maximize their own 
individual utility rather than the joint utility of themselves and their co-worker, then there 
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will be inefficiently high absence due to the effort externality an absenting worker imposes 
on his non-absenting colleague. Cooperation internalizes this externality and permits an 
efficient level of absence to be reached. 
Our empirical analysis of a unique data set suggests that absence is indeed lower 
when employees work in pairs rather than in isolation, a result that lends support for the 
cooperative equilibrium outcome in our theoretical model. Our study, thus, also contributes to 
the literature on absenteeism; by extending the framework of analysis beyond a single 
worker, and by showing that when absence causes negative externalities for co-workers, 
models that do not account for the existence of co-workers are misspecified.  
The paper is set out as follows:  Section 2 recapitulates the original BST contribution, 
which Section 3 then extends to a two-worker environment. Our empirical analysis is set out 
in Section 4 and final comments are collected in Section 5. 
2. Single Worker 
To motivate our empirical analysis we follow BST in assuming that individual workers make 
utility maximizing absence decisions conditional on a realization of their state of health. BST 
models individuals as homogenous risk neutral utility maximizes endowed with a stock of 
time, T, which they allocate between work and leisure. Utility is an increasing function of 
income and leisure, with individuals attaching a weight to each depending upon some 
parameter, δ , representing their general level of health. We assume that δ  is increasing in 
sickness and uniformly distributed over the unit interval, with individuals valuing non-market 
(i.e. leisure) time more as  δ →1.2 Thus:  
                                                
2 We assume that δ  is uniformly distributed over the unit interval to simplify exposition. We show in a series of 
appendices, however, that our results are invariant to any assumed single or joint distribution over δ . 
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 u = 1−δ( )x +δ l  (1) 
where x (l) denotes income (leisure). Prospective workers sign enforceable employment 
contracts that specify a particular level of remuneration, w, in return for a particular supply of 
effort. Considerations as to the intensity or quality of effort are ignored and for simplicity 
productivity is construed by mere attendance. After the contract is signed, but before 
production commences, each worker realizes his state of health and makes an ex post utility 
maximizing decision as regards absence. This decision is derived from a discrete choice with 
workers comparing between the two alternative of absence, a, or non-absence, na, with the 
utility payoffs using the utility function in (1) given by:  
 u
na = 1−δ( )w+δ T − h( )  (2) 
 u
a = 1−δ( )s+δT    (3) 
where s denotes the (exogenous) level of sick pay and h denotes contractual hours. It is 
apparent that the relative magnitude of these payoffs depends on δ  with the worker being 
indifferent between absence and non-absence at a critical level of health  δ = !δ  such that:  
 
una !δ( ) = 1− !δ( )w+ !δ T − h( ) = 1− !δ( )s+ !δT = ua !δ( )  (4) 
which implies:  
 
!δ = w− s
w− s+ h
 (5) 
 !δ  may be interpreted as the worker’s reservation, or threshold, level of sickness - the level of 
sickness at which the worker is indifferent between absence and non-absence - and thus 
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defines a utility maximizing decision rule. To be sure, the worker will choose absence for all 
 δ > !δ  and non-absence otherwise. The situation is illustrated graphically in Figure 1 
following.3 
 
Figure 1:  Single Worker - Reservation Level of Sickness 
3. Two-Workers  
3.1 Non-Cooperative Equilibrium 
Our point of departure from BST is to consider the situation where production in the firm is 
undertaken by two workers, i = 1, 2, who behave in the way just described. Their work, however, 
is interdependent in the sense that the absence of one imposes a cost on the other, possibly in 
terms of extra effort, which is equivalent to supplying additional hours  e∈ 0,h( ⎤⎦ . Thus, the 
utility payoffs to worker 1 from not absenting and absenting are:  
                                                
3 Note that the above decision rule may be derived equivalently from expected utility maximization - see Appendix A1 for 
the assumed uniform distribution case and Appendix A2 for the general distribution case. 
!u 
!!0                                                                   1            δ 
!w 
T!
 s!
T - h!
δ
    Attend         Absent 
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u1
na = 1−δ1( )w+δ1 T − h− 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  (6) 
 u1
a = 1−δ1( )s+δ1T  (7) 
where  
!δ 2  denotes worker 2’s  worker’s reservation level of sickness. Equating these payoffs to 
yield worker 1’s reservation sickness level implies the following reaction function:4  
 
u1
na !δ1( ) = 1− !δ1( )w+ !δ1 T − h− 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 1− !δ1( )s+ !δ1T = u1a !δ1( )
⇒
!δ1 =
w− s
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e
≡ R1 !δ 2( )
 (8) 
And similarly for worker 2:  
 
u2
na !δ 2( ) = 1− !δ 2( )w+ !δ1 T − h− 1− !δ1( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 1− !δ 2( )s+δ 2T = u2a !δ 2( )
⇒
!δ 2 =
w− s
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ1( )e
≡ R2 !δ1( )
 (9) 
 
Ri !δ j( )  denotes worker i’s reaction function - i.e. worker i’s optimal reservation level of 
sickness as a function of worker j’s reservation level of sickness. It is apparent that the two 
reaction functions are upward sloping implying that the two workers’ reservation sickness 
levels are strategic complements for one another. To be sure:  
 
∂Ri !δ j( )
∂ !δ j
=
w− s( )e
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ j( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 > 0  (10) 
                                                
4 We show in Appendix 3 that this decision rule is utility maximizing for the two workers under any distribution of δ . 
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And:  
 
lim
!δ j→0
Ri !δ j( ) = Ri 0( ) = w− sw− s+ h+ e ≡ !δ imin  (11) 
 
lim
!δ j→1
Ri !δ j( ) = Ri 1( ) = w− sw− s+ h ≡ !δ imax  (12) 
Such that:  
ΔRi ≡ Ri 1( )− Ri 0( )⇔ !δimax − !δimin ≡ Δ !δi =
w− s( )e
w− s+ h( ) w− s+ h+ e( )
> 0  (13) 
The reaction functions and associated Nash equilibrium, 
 
!δ n = !δ1
n , !δ 2
n( ) , are illustrated in Figure 2 
following:  
 
Figure 2:  Two-Workers – Nash Equilibrium Reservation Sickness 
! 
!!0                                                                   1             
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Figure 2 graphs the two workers’ reaction functions as upward sloping in 
 
!δ 2 , !δ1( )  space, 
illustrating the idea that each worker’s optimal reservation level of sickness is an increasing 
function of the his co-worker’s reservation level of sickness. Intuitively, the more likely it is 
that one worker will absent (i.e. the lower is 
 
!δ j ) then the more likely it is that the other 
worker will also absent (i.e. the lower is  !δ i ) given the potentially higher costs of attendance.  
The Nash equilibrium in the two-worker situation is given by the intersection of the 
two reaction functions at  !δ1
n = !δ 2
n = !δ n  which implies: 
 
!δ n =
w− s+ h+ e( ) ± w− s+ h+ e( )2 − 4 w− s( )e
2e
 (14) 
We can compare the two-worker situation to the single worker equilibrium most readily by 
focusing directly on the reactions functions set out in expressions (8) and (9). Taking worker 
1, for example, and assuming perfect attendance by worker 2 yields the single-worker 
reservation level of sickness:  
 
lim
!δ2→1
R1 !δ 2( ) ≡ !δ1max = w− sw− s+ h = !δ  (15) 
It is apparent that the Nash Equilibrium is not Pareto efficient and that a collusive agreement 
between the workers would be mutually beneficial. To see this, we first derive in Appendix 
A4 the expected utility of worker 1 within the two-worker setting:  
 
Ε u1{ } = u1
0
1
∫ f δ1( )dδ
⇒
Ε u1{ } = !δ1 w− s( )−
!δ1
2
2
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + 12 T + s( )
 (16) 
Maximizing worker 1’s expected utility with respect to worker 2’s reservation level of 
sickness yields:  
 10 
 
∂Ε u1{ }
∂ !δ 2
= 12 !δ1
2e > 0  (17) 
Thus worker 1’s expected utility is an increasing function of worker 2’s reservation level of 
sickness; intuitively, worker 1’s expected utility increases with the probability of worker two 
attending work since this reduces worker 1’s expected effort cost. This implies that worker 
1’s utility increase as he moves up his reaction function in Figure 2, implying that his 
indifference curves are ‘u-shaped’. To be sure, totally differentiating (16) with respect to  
!δ1  
and  
!δ 2  and setting the resulting expression to zero implies: 
 
dΕ u1{ } =
∂Ε u1{ }
∂ !δ1
d !δ1 +
∂Ε u1{ }
∂ !δ 2
d !δ 2 = 0
⇒
dΕ u1{ } = w− s( )− !δ1 w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ }d !δ1 + 12 !δ12e{ }d !δ 2 = 0
 (18) 
Worker 1’s indifference curves are thus given by:  
 
d !δ 2
d !δ1 dΕ u1{ }=0
=
2 !δ1 w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − w− s( ){ }
!δ1
2e
 (19) 
Recall from (8) that along worker 1’s reaction function we have:  
 (20) 
such that: 
 
d !δ 2
d !δ1 dΕ u1{ }=0
=
2 !δ1 w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − w− s( ){ }
!δ1
2e
= 0  (21) 
 
δ1 w− s+ h+ 1− δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = w− s
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Worker 1’s indifference curves are therefore horizontal as they cross 
 
R1 !δ 2( ) . Increasing  !δ1  
beyond the level defined by 
 
R1 !δ 2( )  whilst holding  !δ 2  constant yields:  
 
d 2 !δ 2
d !δ1
2
dΕ u1{ }=0
=
2 w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ !δ12e− 2 !δ12e 2 w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − w− s( ){ }
!δ1
4e2
⇒
d 2 !δ 2
d !δ1
2
dΕ u1{ }=0
=
2 w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
!δ1
2e
> 0
 (22) 
Thus, worker 1’s indifference curves are positively (negatively) sloped to the right (left) of 
 
R1 !δ 2( ) . Similar arguments apply to worker 2 such that the Nash equilibrium implies an 
intersection of the two workers’ indifference curves - see Figure 3 following:  
 
Figure 3: Pareto Inefficiency of Nash Equilibrium 
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2
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The Nash equilibrium is Pareto inefficient and a mutually preferable, cooperative outcome, 
 !δ
m , is possible to the northeast of  !δ
n  within  
u2
n ,u1
n( ) . The cooperative solution,  !δ m , will lay 
somewhere along a contract curve mapped out by the tangencies of the two workers’ 
indifference curves above  
u2
n ,u1
n( ) , the precise location depending upon the relative 
bargaining powers of the two workers. One possible solution is illustrated in Figure 4 
following:  
 
Figure 4:  Cooperative Solution 
3.2 Cooperative Equilibrium 
We derive the cooperative equilibrium formally by first obtaining the joint expected utility of 
the two workers. It is shown in Appendix A5 that this is given by:  
! 
!!0                                                                   1             
!1 
 
δ 2
 
δ1
 δ n
 
R1 δ 2( )
 
R2 δ1( )
 u1
m
 u2
m
 δ m
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Ε u{ } = u1 + u2( )
0
1
∫
0
1
∫ f δ1,δ 2( )dδ1dδ 2
⇒
Ε u{ } = !δ1 + !δ 2( ) w− s( )− 12 !δ12 + !δ 22( ) w− s+ h( )− 12 !δ12 1− !δ 2( ) + !δ 22 1− !δ1( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦e+T + s
 (23) 
Maximizing expected joint utility as given by (23) with respect to worker 1’s reservation 
level of sickness yields:  
 
∂Ε u{ }
∂δ1
= w− s( )− !δ1 w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +
!δ 2
2
2
e = 0  (24) 
Solving for  
!δ1  yields:  
 
!δ1 =
w− s+ 12 !δ 2
2e
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e
 (25) 
And by symmetry, maximizing expected joint utility with respect to worker 2’s reservation 
level of sickness yields:  
 
!δ 2 =
w− s+ 12 !δ1
2e
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ1( )e
 (26) 
The solution to (25) and (26) yields the joint utility maximizing critical levels of sickness 
 
!δ m = !δ1
m , !δ 2
m( ) . Given the symmetry of the two workers, it must be the case that 
 
!δ1
m = !δ 2
m = !δ m  such that:  
 
!δ m =
w− s+ 12 !δ
m( )2 e
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ m( )e
⇒
!δ m =
w− s+ h+ e( ) ± 12 4 w− s+ h+ e( )2 − 24 w− s( )e
3e
 (27) 
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Whilst it is difficult to compare the Nash and cooperative solutions directly from (14) and 
(27), it is apparent from an examination of the Nash reaction functions (8) and (9) and the 
cooperative expressions (25) and (26) that the cooperative solution must entail a higher 
equilibrium critical level of sickness for the two workers. To see this, we first define 
expressions (25) and (26) as:  
 
!δ1 =
w− s+ 12 !δ 2
2e
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e
≡ C1 !δ 2( )  (28) 
 
!δ 2 =
w− s+ 12 !δ1
2e
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ1( )e
≡ C2 !δ1( )  (29) 
It is apparent that, in terms of Figure 2, 
 
C1 !δ 2( )  is upward sloping, coincides with  R1 !δ 2( )  at 
 
!δ 2 = 0  and lays to the right of  
R1 !δ 2( )  at all  !δ 2 ∈ 0,1( ⎤⎦ . To be sure:  
 
∂C1 !δ 2( )
∂ !δ 2
=
!δ 2 w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + w− s( ){ }e
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 > 0  (30) 
And:  
 
lim
!δ2→0
C1 !δ 2( ) = C1 0( ) = w− sw− s+ h+ e ≡ !δ1
min = R1 0( ) = lim!δ2→0 R1
!δ 2( )  (31) 
 
lim
!δ2→1
C1 !δ 2( ) = C1 1( ) = w− s+
1
2 e
w− s+ h
> w− s
w− s+ h
≡ !δ1
max = R1 1( ) = lim!δ2→1 R1
!δ 2( )  (32) 
Analogous arguments apply to the relationship between 
 
C2 !δ1( )  and  R2 !δ1( )  such that it must 
be the case that  !δ
m > !δ n . 
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Comparing the reaction functions 
 
R1 !δ 2( )  and  R2 !δ1( )  with  !δ , the single worker’s 
reservation level of sickness as defined by equation (5), it is apparent that  
!δ1
max = R1 1( ) = !δ  
and  
!δ 2
max = R2 1( ) = !δ , which implies that the crossing point of  R1
!δ 2( )  and  R2 !δ1( )  must lay 
to the southwest of  !δ  such that  !δ n < !δ . Therefore, as compared to the single worker 
situation, two workers who do not act cooperatively when working together will each have a 
lower reservation level of sickness and thus a higher level of absence. We also know that the 
cooperative outcome implies a higher reservation level of sickness as compared to the non-
cooperation equilibrium such that  !δ m > !δ n . What we do not know is how  !δ m  compares to  !δ . 
Depending on the value of effort,  !δ m  may be located to the northeast of  !δ , as per Figure 5 
following, or to the southwest of  !δ  between  !δ n  as per Figure 6 following: 
 
Figure 5:  Cooperative and Nash Solutions (i) 
! 
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Figure 6: Cooperative and Nash Solutions (ii) 
It is apparent from expressions (8)-(9) and (28)-(29) that the larger is e, the additional effort 
cost from co-worker absence, the further will 
 
C1 !δ 2( )   C2 !δ1( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  lay to the right of [above] 
 
R1 !δ 2( )   R2 !δ1( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ , the further to the northeast will the cooperative functions intersect and the 
more likely will it be the case that  !δ
m > !δ . Intuitively, the larger the potential gains from 
cooperation, the more likely will attendance rates within two-worker firms exceed those 
within single-worker firms.  
4.  Empirical Analysis 
We test our theory by comparing the absence rates of workers who work either alone or in 
pairs. By examining the interaction between the latter, we are able to ascertain whether the 
evidence suggests a cooperative or competitive (i.e. Nash) equilibrium outcome. Empirically, 
if the level of absence is estimated to be lower in two-worker as compared to single-worker 
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firms, then that should be interpreted as evidence of cooperation, since the critical level of 
sickness can only be higher in the former than the latter when workers act cooperatively. The 
opposite result would have an ambiguous interpretation, since it is possible under both the 
competitive and cooperative scenarios to have a lower reservation sickness level and 
therefore a higher level of absence. Symbolically, whilst we know that  !δ > !δ n  and  !δ m > !δ n , 
we are unable to tie down the relationship between  !δ  and  !δ m . 
 Our data comprise the daily absence records of sixty-four optometrists employed by a 
private ophthalmic optician company and who are allocated to one of its twenty-two practices 
operating in the northeast of Scotland over the period April 2005 - September 2008. The 
original sample consists of 18007 observations that reduces to 17943 after excluding the first 
observation of each optometrist in order to create the lag absence variable. On average, 
optometrists appear in the sample for 504 days, with a standard deviation of 228 days. The 
optometrists are professional service providers who examine eyes, prescribe spectacles or 
contact lenses, give advice on visual problems and detect any ocular disease or abnormality, 
referring the patient to a medical practitioner if necessary. Alongside them, there are 
dispensing opticians who meet with the patients after the eye examination with the 
optometrist and who provide advice on spectacles and related products. Finally, each practice 
has also a receptionist in charge of booking appointments and managing the cash register.  
The data is of particular interest to our theoretical framework because we only 
observe optometrists working either on their own or in pairs. Specifically, practices that have 
one examination room (fifteen out of the twenty-two practices in the sample) always have 
only one optometrist for eye examinations (single-testing). In contrast, two optometrists may 
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test together (double-testing) in the seven practices with two examination rooms.5 We can 
therefore distinguish both when (i.e. on which day) and where (i.e. in which practice) 
examinations were undertaken by one or two optometrists. By comparing the daily absence 
records between single-testing and double-testing practices, we are able to test whether 
workers are behaving competitively or cooperatively.6  
When an optometrist is absent, the scheduled appointments are cancelled and 
rescheduled unless a substitute optometrist is found. Optometrists are constrained in the 
number of eye examinations (i.e. appointments) they can perform during a day by the 
National Health Service (NHS) Scotland. Therefore, optometrists who are absent one day are 
not expected to make up all cancellations the next day. Furthermore, they are unaware a 
priori whether or not a substitute optometrist will be sent to the practice. Hence, we assume 
that when making the decision whether to absent, both single and double-testing optometrists 
face the same expected cost of absence in terms of the eye examinations that they will have to 
perform once they return to work.  
Double-testing optometrists are close substitutes in production since in the absence of 
one optometrist the other optometrist, under the terms of their employment contract, may 
pick up additional appointments, without extra pay, in order to minimize the cancelling and 
rescheduling of appointments. Therefore, double-testing implies a joint production process 
that fits well within the framework of our theoretical model.  
                                                
5 Thus, whilst single-optometrist practices can only undertake single-testing, two-optometrist practices can undertake both 
single- and double-testing. 
6 The two optometrists operate in separate testing rooms when double-testing and there is normally limited interaction 
between them during the day. We therefore presume that double-testing does not proffer any additional job satisfaction, 
which thus precludes alternative interpretations of the cooperative outcome. In addition, there are no differences in the work 
attributes, such as the workload or the remuneration optometrists receive, between single-testing or double-testing. Hence, 
we can argue that the relationship we identify between double-testing and absenteeism is not driven by unobserved work-
related differences that could act as confounding factors in the estimated models. 
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Although the majority of optometrists are allocated to specific practices, there is some 
degree of mobility. Every month a rota schedule assigns optometrists to practices, the 
allocation being determined primarily by contractual negotiation and the geographical 
location of the optometrists. A potential issue is that more reliable workers may be allocated 
to larger practices with two testing rooms, serving more popular areas that have higher 
demand for their services. To explore this latent selectivity, we examined whether an 
optometrist’s past absence affected his probability of performing double-testing. Our 
estimates, which are available on request, are based on a linear probability model with 
clustered standard errors, where aside from past absence we also include a set of controls for 
the day of the week, the month and the year. In addition we include control variables for 
working only half-day and for identifying whether the current practice is the practice in 
which an optometrist spends the majority of her time. The monthly rota is decided at least 
one month in advance, so for robustness purposes we used optometrists’ absence one, two 
and three month before the allocation is determined. Our results are robust regardless to how 
far back we go to measure absence and suggest that there is no relationship between past 
absence and assignment to single- or double-testing. Furthermore, our results remained the 
same when we also explored whether past absence affects the allocation of optometrists to 
practices with one or two testing rooms, regardless to whether or not they were performing 
double-testing on that particular day. Thus, the process of the rota schedule can be considered 
to be exogenous. 7 
The absence data are constructed using three different company records: (i) the 
absence records, (ii) the monthly rota schedules and (iii) the business records of the twenty-
two practices. The business records contain daily information on which optometrists were 
                                                
7 The two outcomes differ because although an optometrist may be working in a practice that has two testing rooms, she 
may be working on her own (single-testing) on a particular day. 
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examining at each practice, enabling us to identify cases where a replacement optometrist 
was sent to cover a colleague who was absent that day. Furthermore, we can derive daily 
information on whether: (i) the practice was undertaking Single-Testing or Double-Testing; 
(ii) the practice offered eye examination either in the morning or afternoon only (Half-Day). 
Finally, we are able also to identify the practice in which an optometrist spends the majority 
of their time (Main Practice). 
Table 1 presents definitions and summary statistics of the main variables used in the 
analysis. The number of working days that optometrists missed over the sample period due to 
absence account for 1.3% of their total contracted days. Despite that fact that there is some 
flexibility in the allocation of optometrists across practices, optometrists spent three quarters 
of their working time in a particular practice. Double-testing occurred on approximately 19% 
of the working days covered by the sample whilst 4% of testing was undertaken on half-days 
(i.e. with eye examinations appointments only in the morning or afternoon). Finally, we 
calculate the average probability of a replacement worker being sent to a practice when the 
originally assigned optometrist is absent. This is estimated at practice level per year. On 
average, the expected replacement probability is 36.5%. A detailed discussion on how this 
probability is estimated is presented in Appendix A4. 
Table 1: Variable List and Definitions 
Variable Mean Std. D               Definition 
Absence 0.013 0.112 1 if optometrist absent today; 0:  otherwise 
Lag Absence 0.013 0.112 1 if optometrist absent yesterday; 0: otherwise 
Main Practice 0.753 0.431 1 if optometrist's main practice; 0: otherwise1 
Half-Day  0.040 0.195 1 if testing only in morning or afternoon today; 0:  otherwise 
Double-Testing  0.188 0.391 1 if two optometrists are assigned to the practice today; 0: otherwise 
Replacement Probability 0.365 0.165   Expected replacement probability in current practice 
Note: 1. Main Practice is defined annually as the practice in which the optometrist worked more than any other over the year. 
The estimated equation of interest is an absence model with a binary dependent variable. The 
key explanatory variable is Double-Testing, a dummy variable that reflects whether or not 
there are two optometrists that are assigned to perform the eye examinations in a practice that 
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day. This is the main variable of interest in our analysis, since the sign and significance of the 
estimated coefficient will indicate whether optometrists, when working together, behave 
cooperatively to maximize joint expected utility, or independently with their individual 
expected utility solely in mind. A positive coefficient will have an ambiguous interpretation 
since  !δ n < !δ  and  !δ n < !δ m  whilst  !δ m  exceed or fall short of  !δ  depending upon the effort cost 
of absence. A negative coefficient, however, can only be interpreted as evidence that workers 
act cooperatively, since only the cooperative outcome is able to yield a reservation level of 
sickness in excess of the single-worker equilibrium. 
Our estimator is a linear probability model with clustered standard errors and our 
results are presented in Table 2.8 The basic model specification (column 1) includes only 
Double-Testing and the predicted average probability of a replacement optometrist being sent 
to the practice if absent (Replacement Probability).9 For robustness purposes we also 
consider alternative specifications that include: (i) the optometrist’s absence the previous day 
(Lag Absence) in order to capture any state dependence effects (column 2); (ii) whether the 
optometrist is working at their main practice (Main Practice) and / or working only half a day 
(Half-Day) (column 3); (iii) the days of the week, in order to capture unobserved time 
preferences (column 4); and, (iv) the month of the year, for unobserved seasonal effects 
(column 5).  
In all specifications considered, optometrists exhibit lower absence when working in 
teams of two (Double-Testing) as compared to when working alone (Single-Testing). The 
                                                
8 Given that our dataset is a long panel, consisting of a relatively small number of optometrists observed over a relatively 
long period of time, we also considered a fixed effects model as an alternative estimator. Since fixed effects regression uses 
only information from changes within an individual (optometrist), it excludes all individuals who were never absent from 
work (i.e. zero variation). We therefore decided against such an approach because it would have excluded almost half of the 
optometrists from our sample.  
9 As a robustness check, we also incorporated the observed replacement ratio into an alternative specification, restricting the 
sample to practices that had some level of absence during a particular year. The estimates overall remained the same and are 
available upon request. 
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estimated effects suggest that moving from single-testing to double-testing reduces the 
probability of absence by 0.004 percentage points10. Whilst small in absolute terms, with an 
average absence rate of 1.3 percent, this implies a potential relative fall in the probability of 
absence of 30 percent.  
These result supports the cooperative equilibrium outcome in which workers act to 
maximize joint expected utility and suggests that they have a higher reservation level of 
sickness,  !δ
m , than that of a single worker,  !δ . Diagrammatically, this means that  !δ
m  is 
located to the northeast of  !δ , as per Figure 5.  
The remaining results accord largely with our ex ante expectations. Specifically, 
optometrists exhibit higher absence when working half-days or in practices that are more 
likely to get another optometrist to cover for absence. Lag absence is also a good predictor of 
current absence, with optometrists who were absent the previous day being more likely to be 
absent the following day as well. There is no evidence that optometrists are less likely to 
absent when working in their main practice and whilst there is some evidence of ‘Monday 
blues’ there is no real evidence of seasonal variation. 
 
                                                
10 The results are verified also when using a probit model with robust standard errors. Optometrists who work in teams of 
two are significantly less likely to be absent, although the calculated marginal effects of double-testing are smaller in 
magnitude than the linear probability estimates. 
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Table 2: Regression Estimates – Linear Probability 
Dependent Variable: Absence = 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Workplace Controls           
Double-Testing -0.007*** 0.004 -0.004*** 0.002 -0.004*** 0.002 -0.004*** 0.002 -0.004*** 0.002 
Replacement Probability *0.078*** 0.019 0.044*** 0.008 0.045*** 0.009 0.045*** 0.009 0.045*** 0.009 
Lag Absence - - 0.474*** 0.056 0.474*** 0.056 0.474*** 0.056 0.473*** 0.056 
Main Practice - - - - -0.002*** 0.003 -0.002*** 0.003 -0.002*** 0.003 
Half-Day  - - - - *0.021*** 0.009 0.022*** 0.009 0.022*** 0.009 
Day Controls           
Tuesday - - - - - - -0.005*** 0.004 -0.005*** 0.004 
Wednesday - - - - - - -0.004*** 0.003 -0.004*** 0.003 
Thursday - - - - - - -0.005*** 0.003 -0.005*** 0.003 
Friday - - - - - - -0.002*** 0.004 -0.002*** 0.004 
Saturday - - - - - - -0.007*** 0.004 -0.007*** 0.004 
Sunday - - - - - - -0.005*** 0.006 -0.005*** 0.006 
Month Controls           
February - - - - - - - - -0.003*** 0.004 
March - - - - - - - - -0.004*** 0.004 
April - - - - - - - - -0.006*** 0.003 
May - - - - - - - -  8.33e-5** 0.006 
June - - - - - - - - -0.004*** 0.003 
July - - - - - - - - -0.006*** 0.004 
August - - - - - - - - -8.42e-5** 0.005 
September - - - - - - - - -0.004*** 0.004 
October - - - - - - - - -4.85e-4** 0.004 
November - - - - - - - - -0.002*** 0.005 
December - - - - - - - - -0.005*** 0.005 
Constant -0.014*** 0.005 -0.009*** 0.003 -0.008*** 0.002 -0.004*** 0.004 -0.001**** 0.005 
Observations 17943 17943 17943 17943 17943 
Log-Likelihood 13894.792 16168.765 16184.497 16188.837 16193.761 
Note: 1. Linear probability estimates with clustered standard errors; 2. Level of statistical significance: * for 0.1, ** for 0.05, *** for 0.01; 3. SE = Standard Error 
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5. Final Comments 
We develop a theoretical model of worker interaction and explore the impact on absence 
from workers acting cooperatively or competitively. Our model suggests that a non-
cooperative equilibrium outcome yields an inefficiently high absence rate on account of the 
effort externality an absenting worker imposes on his non-absenting colleague. In contrast, 
when workers cooperate the externality is internalized and a lower, efficient level of absence 
can be reached. We test the model on a dataset of optometrists who either work in pairs 
Double-Testing or alone (Single-Testing). We find that those working in pairs are 
significantly less likely to absent, a result that supports the cooperative equilibrium prediction 
from our theoretical model. 
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Appendix  
A1: Deriving the single-worker decision rule from expected utility maximization - uniform distribution 
The individual’s expected utility may be written as: 
u
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  (A1.1) 
Maximizing (A1.1) with respect to  
!δ  implies:  
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∂Ε u{ }
∂ !δ
= w− s+ !δ −w− h+ s( ) = 0
⇒
!δ = w− s
w− s+ h
 (A1.2) 
A2: Deriving the single-worker decision rule from expected utility maximization - general case 
The individual’s expected utility may be written as: 
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0
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Integrating by parts using the general rule: 
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a
b
a
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∫ − u dv
a
b
∫  (A2.2) 
Assume  v = δ  and  
f δ( )dδ = du , where  u = F δ( )  since  f δ( )dδ = du⇒ f δ( ) = du dδ ⇒u = F δ( ) . 
Therefore: 
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And: 
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Using the above expressions and noting that 
 
F δ( ) = 1 when  δ ∈ 0,1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 1 , the expected utility function can be 
rewritten as: 
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 (A2.5) 
Maximizing (A2.5) with respect to  
!δ implies:  
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which implies: 
 
!δ = w− s
w− s+ h
 (A2.7) 
Hence, the reservation level of sickness,  
!δ , is invariant to the choice of 
 
f ⋅( )  for δ . 
A3:  Deriving the two-worker decision rule from expected utility maximization - general case 
Write joint expected utility as: 
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 (A3.1) 
Define the third and forth terms of (A3.1) as: 
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Note that only u2
na  out of the four utility components 
 
u1
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a ,u2
na ,u2
a( )  is a function of  !δ1  and use the property: 
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Maximise joint expected utility with respect to  
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Note that: 
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Since: 
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 (A3.6) 
Thus, (A3.4) reduces to: 
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 (A3.7) 
Since 
 
f δ1,δ 2( )  is a probability density function it follows that: 
 29 
 
p u1
na − u1
a( ) + 1− p( ) u1na − u1a( ) = 0
⇒
u1
na − u1
a( ) = 0
⇒
u1
na = u1
a
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where 
 
p ∈ 0,1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ . Thus, in a two-worker setting, individual 1 - and by symmetry individual 2 - will maximize 
joint expected utility by adopting the decision rule  ui
na = ui
a ,  i = 1,2 . 
A4:  Deriving expected utility of worker 1 within a two-worker setting  
 
Ε u1{ } = u1
0
1
∫ f δ1( )dδ
⇒
Ε u1{ } = 1−δ1( )w+δ1 T − h− 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ }
0
!δ1
∫ dδ1 + 1−δ1( )s+δ1T⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
!δ1
1
∫ dδ1
⇒
Ε u1{ } = δ1s+ δ1
2
2
T − h− 1− !δ 2( )e− w( )⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
0
!δ1
+ δ1s+
δ 2
2
T − s( )⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
!δ1
1
⇒
Ε u1{ } = !δ1w+
!δ1
2
2
T − h− 1− !δ 2( )e− w⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + s+ 12 T − s( )− !δ1s−
!δ1
2
2
T − s( )
⇒
Ε u1{ } = !δ1 w− s( )−
!δ1
2
2
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + 12 T + s( )
 (A4.1) 
A5:  Deriving joint expected utility  
First, define:  
 
Χ1 ≡ Ε u1
na{ } = 1−δ1( )w+δ1 T − h− e 1− !δ 2( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  (A5.1) 
And: 
 
Y1 ≡ Ε u1
a{ } = 1−δ1( )s+δ1T  (A5.2) 
Thus, defining the joint utility of the two workers as  u = u1 + u2 , we have:  
 
Ε u{ } = u1 + u2( )
0
1
∫
0
1
∫ f δ1,δ 2( )dδ1dδ 2  (A5.3) 
⇒  
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Ε u{ } = Χ1 dδ1 + Y1 dδ1
!δ1
1
∫ + u2
0
1
∫
0
!δ1
∫ dδ1
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥0
1
∫ dδ 2  (A5.4) 
⇒  
 
Ε u{ } = 1−δ1( )w+δ1 T − h− e 1− !δ 2( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ }dδ1 + 1−δ1( )s+ δ1T⎡⎣ ⎤⎦dδ1 + u2
!δ1
1
∫
0
!δ1
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥0
1
∫ dδ 2  (A5.5) 
⇒  
 
Ε u{ } = w+δ1 T − w− h− e 1− !δ 2( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ }dδ1 + 1−δ1( )s +δ1T⎡⎣ ⎤⎦dδ1 + u2
!δ1
1
∫
0
!δ1
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥0
1
∫ dδ 2  (A5.6) 
⇒  
 
Ε u{ } = δ1w+ δ1
2
2
T − w− h− e 1− !δ 2( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪0
!δ1
+ δ1s+
δ1
2
2
T − s( )⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
!δ1
1
+ u2
0
1
∫ dδ 2  (A5.7) 
⇒  
 
Ε u{ } = !δ1w+
!δ1
2
2
T − w− h− e 1− !δ 2( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + s+ 12 T − s( )− s !δ1 −
!δ1
2
2
T − s( ) + u2
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪0
1
∫ dδ 2  (A5.8) 
⇒  
 
Ε u{ } = !δ1 w− s( )−
!δ1
2
2
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + 12 T + s( ) + u2
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪0
1
∫ dδ 2  (A5.9) 
Thus:  
 
Ε u{ } = Ζ1 + u2( )
0
1
∫ dδ 2 = Ζ1 dδ 2
0
1
∫ + Χ2 dδ 2
0
!δ2
∫ + Y2 dδ 2
!δ2
1
∫  (A5.10) 
where:  
 
Ζ1 =
!δ1 w− s( )−
!δ1
2
2
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + 12 T + s( )  (A5.11) 
 
Χ2 ≡ Ε u2
na{ } = 1−δ 2( )w+δ 2 T − h− e 1− !δ1( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  (A5.12) 
 
Y2 ≡ Ε u2
a{ } = 1−δ 2( )s+δ 2T  (A5.13) 
Thus:  
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Ε u{ } = Ζ1 + u2( )
0
1
∫ dδ 2 = Ζ1 dδ 2
0
1
∫ + Χ2 dδ 2
0
!δ2
∫ + Y2 dδ 2
!δ2
1
∫ = Ζ1 + Ζ 2
⇒
Ε u{ } = !δ1 w− s( )−
!δ1
2
2
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ 2( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + 12 T + s( ) +
+ !δ 2 w− s( )−
!δ 2
2
2
w− s+ h+ 1− !δ1( )e⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + 12 T + s( )
⇒
Ε u{ } = !δ1 + !δ 2( ) w− s( )− 12 !δ12 + !δ 22( ) w− s+ h( ) + !δ12 1− !δ 2( ) + !δ 22 1− !δ1( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦e{ }+T + s
 (A5.14) 
A6:  Deriving the expected probability of obtaining a replacement in the incidence of an absence 
The purpose of the analysis here is to calculate how likely it is for a replacement to be sent to a practice when an 
optometrist is absent. Based on the information we have on replacement optometrists, we measure the average 
replacement probability for the practices that had some absence, separately per annum for each practice. This 
variable is the dependent variable in the equation we estimate, taking values from zero to one. The explanatory 
variables include the following practice-specific characteristics, calculated annually: (i) the mean absence rate 
(Mean Absence); (ii) the mean number of double-testing days (Mean Double Testing); (iii) the mean number of 
half-days (Mean Half-Days); and (iv) the distance of the practice from the company’s nearest practice 
(Distance). By construction, there is variation in the dependent and independent variables both across practices 
and over time. The model is estimated at the practice level using a Tobit estimator and the results are set out in 
Table A6 following: 
Table A6: Regression Estimate  
Dependent Variable: Mean Replacement (at practice level) 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Mean Absence 21.456*** 0.497 
Mean Double Testing 0.261*** 0.022 
Mean Half-Days 1.208*** 0.150 
Distance -0.007*** 7.35e-4 
Constant  -0.045*** 0.017 
Observations 13066 
Log-Likelihood -12124.816 
Note: Tobit estimates. Level of statistical significance: * for 0.1, ** for 0.05, and *** for 0.01 
Based on these estimates, we derive the expected replacement probability for all the practices and years in the 
dataset. 
